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# National Intelligence Bulletin

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August 16, 1975

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Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028000010033-4

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
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### BANGLADESH

The military-led coup yesterday has met no significant resistance. A new civilian government has been installed, but the government could be only a front for a military junta.

The ten-member cabinet announced by President Ahmed is composed largely of noncontroversial members of former president Mujib's government and his Awami League party. Mujib's closest advisers in the party and government have not been included.

The new government has received the public support of leaders of the armed services, police, and paramilitary forces. This includes the acting head of the 16,000-member National Defense Force, which is made up of veterans of the war of independence in 1971 who were especially close to Mujib.

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


Pakistan yesterday became the first country to recognize the new regime. The change in Dacca should pave the way for better relations between the two countries, which were stalemated in part because of Mujib's unwillingness to compromise on his differences with Islamabad.

There has been no significant reaction thus far from New Delhi. The Indian government, which had close relations with Mujib, will scrutinize the new regime closely, but is unlikely to interfere unless resistance to the new government develops and plunges the nation into civil war. Ahmed is aware of Indian sensitivities, particularly over the fate of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh, and will presumably make every effort to dispel New Delhi's fears.

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### TURKEY

Small groups of radical leftists plan to organize anti-US and anti-NATO demonstrations this weekend in the Turkish cities of Izmir, Ankara, and Istanbul. The leftists are seeking to create the impression there is widespread anti-US sentiment in Turkey. Turkish authorities have already sent combat units to Ankara in anticipation of either planned or spontaneous anti-American protests.

Leftist political parties and unions have had more room to maneuver since martial law, imposed last year during the Cyprus war, was terminated earlier this month. Currently, the most active group is the Turkish Revolutionary People's Workers and Peasants Party. The party is small and has been outlawed since 1971, but it remains one of the best organized revolutionary groups in Turkey. It has a history of violent activities and reportedly controls and directs several other radical leftist groups that were involved in the recent student unrest and political violence in Turkey.

Twenty-six members of the Revolutionary Party were arrested after they occupied the US exchange retail store at Izmir on August 7. The group claimed they were "liberating a Turkish-owned building occupied by the imperialists." This was the largest anti-US incident involving the Turkish populace since the arms embargo was imposed. The demonstrations planned for this weekend by the Revolutionary Party are intended, in part, to protest these arrests.

In general, the Turkish population has reacted mildly to the suspension of US arms. That could change, however, during the partial senatorial election campaign in October. The status of US bases in Turkey is likely to be a key issue for political debate, which in Turkey often becomes violent. Opposition leaders have already attacked the Demirel government for what they consider to be a weak response to the continuing arms embargo.

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### PORTUGAL

The Portuguese Communists, who have nearly been driven underground in the northern part of the country, have scheduled a rally for tonight in the northern town of Alcobaca—site of one of the first incidents of anti-Communist violence.

The decision to reassert a Communist presence in the north was announced by party leader Cunhal at a Lisbon rally on Thursday. Cunhal, who had not appeared in public for several weeks, said Communist militants should not fear returning to those areas in the north from which they have been forcibly driven out.

This well-advertised challenge to the anti-Communists in the north may result in violence; the Communists would not venture into this area unless they were well armed. The Socialists and the Communists, however, merely shouted slogans at each other last week when they held rival demonstrations in the southern town of Evora.

The Communist-controlled labor federation has called for a brief general strike on Tuesday. The strike itself will have little impact, but it is another sign that the Communists are prepared to take the offensive.

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### FRANCE-NATO

France will oppose any move to give NATO a major role in overseeing implementation of the agreement signed last month at the European security conference summit in Helsinki.

A high official of the French Foreign Ministry has told US embassy officers that France believes the multilateral phase of CSCE is over. Paris does not see an active role for either NATO or the EC in security conference follow-up activities. The official did acknowledge that NATO might be useful as a forum for exchanging information concerning progress made in bilateral exchanges. He also conceded that the UN Economic Commission for Europe as well as UNESCO might play a limited role.

French policy will focus on traditional bilateral diplomacy; this theme will be stressed during President Giscard's visit to Moscow in October. The French position is that each country should be free to concentrate on those issues most relevant to its own interests.

On security matters, for example, Paris expects Moscow to campaign now for disarmament in Europe. France will continue to resist any moves that it believes may threaten the maintenance of adequate defenses in Western Europe. In particular, Paris is concerned that the force reduction talks in Vienna, in which France does not participate, may redound to the Warsaw Pact's advantage.

The French retain the Gaullist wariness of committing themselves to multilateral organizations and remain particularly suspicious of NATO. France, moreover, has consistently avoided ventures that could be labeled "bloc confrontations" and would see any NATO domination of the Helsinki follow-up in that light.

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### CHINA-CAMBODIA-VIETNAM

Peking has enthusiastically welcomed Cambodian deputy prime ministers Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary, lauding the new regime's achievements and promising continuing support. The visit is the first trip abroad for Cambodia's communist leaders since they assumed power last April.

A *People's Daily* editorial on the visit points up the importance Peking attaches to continuing close ties with Phnom Penh, and both sides clearly view the visit as a highly visible means of reaffirming their relationship. The Chinese probably consider the visit important in light of the recent trip to Cambodia by North Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan.

A continuation or a possible increase in Chinese economic and technical assistance to Cambodia will probably head the list of topics to be discussed during Khieu's visit. The Chinese have been by far the largest foreign contributors to Cambodian rehabilitation since the communist take-over, and Chinese technicians currently in Cambodia number in the hundreds. Although Peking has not yet made any public promises, the Chinese are almost certainly prepared to assure the Cambodians of continuing economic and technical assistance as one way of maintaining a dominant position in Phnom Penh.

Prince Sihanouk's role in the new regime is a subject that probably cannot be avoided, but the Chinese appear to be in no mood to push the Cambodian communists on this score.

Sihanouk apparently remains in Pyongyang, but may return to Peking in order to discuss the question of his possible return to Cambodia.

Chinese treatment of a North Vietnamese economic delegation now in Peking, led by Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi, is much cooler in tone than the Chinese commentary on the Cambodian visit. In fact, discrepancies in the reporting of Chinese and Vietnamese news agencies point to continuing frictions between Peking and Hanoi.

Chinese coverage of Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's comments at a welcoming banquet for the Vietnamese delegation emphasized international issues and included a reference to Vietnamese struggles against "imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism." Vietnamese press accounts dropped this phrase, presumably because of Soviet sensitivities on the hegemony issue. The delegation is scheduled to visit Moscow after finishing up in Peking.



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The Vietnamese concentrated on purely bilateral issues—especially economic assistance—in their coverage of the visit. The Vietnamese quoted Le Thanh Nghi as concluding that an increase in Chinese aid to Vietnam would be “of great importance” to Vietnam. The Chinese press includes nothing on this issue, suggesting that the two sides may be far apart on the question of Chinese aid.

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### PHILIPPINES

President Marcos' announcement Thursday that he has arranged a cease-fire with the radical Muslim Moro National Liberation Front should be regarded with skepticism.

The government statement outlining the accord asserts that Marcos reached agreement with Abdul Hamid Lukman, whom the Philippine government terms a legal adviser and central committee member of the Liberation Front. It said that subsequent meetings would be held to work out arrangements for Muslim autonomy and the creation of an internal security force, two key demands of rebel leaders at negotiations in Jidda last January.

It seems likely that Lukman merely has defected to the government side and that the cease-fire announcement is only another part of a many-pronged government effort to divide and confuse the rebels, while trying to convince world Islamic leaders that Manila is making a sincere effort to meet rebel demands. A major feature of this campaign has been highly publicized agreements with rebel defectors. None of the defectors has been a high-ranking leader nor have the agreements had much practical significance. Lukman was a member of the rebel delegation at the Jidda talks, but he was evidently only a recent recruit to the Front and not a member of leader Nur Misuari's inner circle.

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### MALAYSIA

Sabah State Chief Minister Tun Mustapha, as expected, has demonstrated his local political strength in his confrontation with the federal government by winning an overwhelming vote of confidence from the state assembly on August 11. The real test of strength, however, is yet to come.

The formation in mid-July of Berjaya, a new state opposition party that has the tacit backing of Prime Minister Razak, brought the power struggle into public view and precipitated the most serious challenge thus far to the Sabah strongman's rule. Berjaya, an amalgam of politicians who desire to remove Mustapha, has called for an investigation of charges of his extravagance, misappropriation of public funds, and harboring secessionist intentions. Evidence of serious secessionist thinking is a major reason the federal government is trying to oust Mustapha. Mustapha denies the secession charge and is attempting to deflect the other allegations by pushing for an examination of corruption at the federal level.

Although Prime Minister Razak seeks to avoid a direct confrontation, he is obviously intent on ousting Mustapha or at least imposing greater restraints on him. Razak has prompted indirect negotiations with Mustapha, which reportedly have resulted in a face-saving solution involving Mustapha's voluntary resignation within a few months. After the state vote of confidence, Mustapha did announce that he planned to step down "shortly," but he has reneged on such commitments in the past. His ultimate departure is by no means certain.

The struggle is compounded by Mustapha's connections with Islamic leaders in the Middle East and his support for the Philippine Muslim rebels. By working with Libya and possibly other Islamic elements to filter arms and funds to the rebels through Sabah, he has contributed to Arab involvement in insular Southeast Asia and to friction between Malaysia and the Philippines. His ouster would remove a major irritant in relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila, but would not necessarily resolve their differences over the insurgency.

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### CHILE

Santiago's economic plight and the government's poor international image are contributing to increased friction within the governing junta. So far, dissatisfaction with President Pinochet has been low key and has not threatened his authority, but criticism is likely to become sharper in the months ahead.

In recent conversations with US Ambassador Popper and visiting USIA Director Keogh, General Leigh, a key junta member, took some very direct pot shots at policies closely linked to Pinochet. On the economy, for example, Leigh said he had serious reservations about the effects of the government's austerity measures and, in particular, their impact on the lowest economic strata.

Most sources have reported a rapid deterioration of economic conditions during the past year, a trend clearly evident in the industrial slowdown and extensive increase in unemployment. Predictions that some Chileans will starve are being heard more frequently as the last weeks of winter add to existing hardships for the middle and lower classes. The growing number of beggars on the streets of the capital and the appearance of soup kitchens are indicative of the massive problems facing the government. Its resources are limited, and it is unlikely to be able to ease the situation to any great extent.

General Leigh's concern about the government's ability to withstand the current high rate of unemployment and the almost certain spread of discontent is shared by other officers. Unless some improvement can be shown by the end of the year, pressure is likely to increase for a shift in economic policies and replacement of the present team of advisers.

Pinochet's handling of human rights issues has also become a source of friction. General Leigh expressed dissatisfaction with the management of the government's public relations position, and he voiced criticism of the way Pinochet handled decisions concerning the UN Human Rights Commission's efforts to visit Santiago. Leigh said something must be done. He intends to request a special junta meeting soon to take up the matter.

The question of the future political course of the military government likewise seems to be viewed in different ways. Pinochet has announced publicly that the military intends to stay in power for an indefinite period. Leigh seems to believe that this is impossible and that Chile must find a way to return to a democratic system with a strong executive.

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### BRAZIL

The reaction of the opposition party to President Geisel's recent speech reflects its realization that the government has made a major concession to hard-line military conservatives by abandoning liberalization as one of its major goals. Opposition leaders now believe that their gains in last year's congressional elections have backfired by suggesting to the enemies of liberalization that the balloting showed public repudiation of the military's exercise of power.

Proponents of liberalization had hoped that Geisel would reaffirm his intention to continue the process of easing controls on politics. When he failed to address such controversial issues as press censorship or illegal arrests, they were bitterly disappointed.

Geisel further confounded the opposition party by virtually co-opting its entire social program. Opposition leader Guimaraes has responded in unusually strong language, denouncing the "switch in signals" and scoring the President's call for vigilance against communist subversion as providing the pretext for a "witch hunt." This outburst provoked a sharp rebuttal by the head of the government party, who apparently sought to create the impression that he is more than a match for the opposition. Guimaraes reportedly also angered Geisel, but a presidential spokesman has indicated that no action will be taken against him.

Pro-government and opposition politicians intend to participate actively in coming party and municipal elections to test the government's willingness to permit elections as open as the ones last year. Geisel's speech appears to have made it clear, however, that the government will take no other steps to reduce controls on political activity. [REDACTED]

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
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